Introduction
A change in or the consolidation of control of a company can be achieved in many different ways and one way is to use a scheme of arrangement. Schemes of arrangement began to be used to effect takeovers after the English Courts sanctioned a scheme in the case of In re National Bank Ltd 1 which resulted in one person acquiring control of all the issued shares of a company. that where an offer in respect of an affected transaction was implemented by way of such a scheme, the company proposing the scheme was deemed to be the offeree company, and the person who became the holder of relevant equity securities of the company after the scheme was sanctioned by the courts was deemed to be the offeror. The word "offer" was defined as including an offer in respect of an affected transaction, however any of the types of transaction covered by the definition. 11 The focus was on the result of the transaction, rather than on its structure. 
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The Companies Act 2008 has adopted a different approach to affected transactions.
The definition of "affected transaction" 12 focuses (at least initially) on specific types of transactions. For example, a disposal of all or the greater part of the assets or undertaking of a regulated company as contemplated in section 112 is defined as an affected transaction, as well as an amalgamation or merger as contemplated in section 113, provided it involves at least one regulated company. 13 A scheme of arrangement between a regulated company and its shareholders as contemplated in section 114 is also now specifically included under the definition of an "affected transaction". 14 The definition does not immediately focus on transactions resulting in changes or consolidation of control of the offeree company (the target company).
15
The fact that specific named types of transactions are defined as affected A private company will be a regulated company only if its Memorandum of Incorporation expressly provides that the company and its securities are subject to Parts B and C and the Takeover Regulations or if more than 10 per cent of the issued securities of that company "have been transferred, other than by transfer between or among related or inter-related persons, within the period of 24 months immediately before the date of a particular affected transaction or offer": s 118(1)-(2) rw reg 91. Note that reg 91(2)(b) stipulates that a buy back by a company of securities that are cancelled is not a transfer for the purposes of assessing if the percentage threshold has been achieved. The definition of related or interrelated persons is found in s 1 rw s 2(1)(a)-(c). 
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transaction". The regulation of transactions which are affected transactions (as defined) would now seem to be more about the regulation of situations involving what could be viewed as an alteration of the fundamental nature of a regulated company rather than exclusively about the regulation of transactions which would result in a change or consolidation of control of the voting securities of the company.
Although a scheme of arrangement involving a regulated company may well result in a change of control or a consolidation of the control of the company in relation to the voting securities of that company, there is no specific requirement that this be the result before it falls under the definition of an affected transaction. The focus is on the scheme itself and not on the effect of the scheme. The purpose of this article is therefore to comment generally on the definition of a scheme of arrangement as an affected transaction, highlighting the elements of a 17 As a scheme of arrangement between a regulated company and its shareholders as contemplated in s 114 is now specifically defined as an "affected transaction" (see s 117 (1) 
scheme of arrangement. In this context specific consideration will be given to transactions which include a re-acquisition by the company of its own previously issued securities and when such a re-acquisition would on its own be considered to be a scheme of arrangement and an affected transaction. Comment will be included on the obligation to appoint an independent expert to report on the scheme and the relevance, if any, of the solvency and liquidity of the company embarking on a scheme of arrangement. Finally, consideration will be given to the need to have a scheme of arrangement approved by a special resolution and the potential exclusion of certain voting rights.
Elements of a scheme of arrangement
The definition of an "affected transaction" includes a scheme of arrangement between a regulated company and its shareholders "as contemplated in section whether an arrangement meant that the shareholders' interests could be altered but not altogether extinguished. 22 Another issue that was debated was the extent to which the company had to play an active role in the scheme before it could be called an arrangement as between the company and a class of its shareholders. which is specifically defined in section 1.) The only element that would seem to be required to make a scheme a scheme of arrangement as contemplated under section 114 is that it must be an arrangement between the company and holders of any class of securities in that company. The extent to which the company would need to be actively involved in the scheme to make it such an arrangement is debatable, but all of the methods listed would clearly involve the company in at least a number of administrative tasks.
Schemes of arrangement may be structured in many different ways and could include, for example, a consolidation of different classes of securities or a reacquisition by the company of its own securities. 24 However, the question arises whether, for example, any proposal by a company to re-acquire some of its shares in terms of section 48 would constitute a scheme of arrangement as contemplated in section 114. The answer is important, as it would determine the sections and rules that regulate the proposed transaction and the procedure that must be followed and the approvals that must be obtained.
If the proposed arrangement "contemplated in this section" (ie section 114) may have as a result the re-acquisition by the company of any (emphasis added) of its previously issued securities, section 48 (which regulates the re-acquisition by a company of its own shares) will apply to the proposed arrangement. 25 Regulations culminating in the receipt of a compliance certificate, or the company would need to apply for exemption for the transaction. The effect of interpreting a reacquisition by a company of more than 5 per cent of the issued shares as a scheme company of its issued shares. The word "securities" is defined in s 1 to include shares, but it is not limited thereto. Such a re-acquisition by a regulated company might trigger the obligation to make a mandatory offer under section 123 and a mandatory offer as contemplated in that section is in any event defined as an "affected transaction". 30 However, if such a reacquisition does not trigger this obligation, the question remains -is it only where the company proposing such a re-acquisition designates it as part of what it calls a scheme of arrangement that it becomes a scheme of arrangement?
29 As the word "acquisition" is defined in s 117(1)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 to include an acquisition by a regulated company of its own securities as contemplated in s 48, it would seem that a re-acquisition by a regulated company of its own securities could potentially trigger the disclosure obligations of s 122. An acquisition of a beneficial interest in voting securities of a regulated company to the extent contemplated in s 122(1) is included under the definition of an affected transaction by s 117(1)(c)(iv). S 122(1)(a) is triggered when a person "acquires a beneficial interest in sufficient securities of a class issued by that company such that, as a result of the acquisition, the person holds a beneficial interest in securities amounting to 5%, 10%, 15%, or any further multiples of 5%, of the issued securities of that class". A re-acquisition by the company could potentially shift the relative holdings in the company and result in a holder of securities in the company acquiring a beneficial interest in sufficient securities of the company to trigger the disclosure obligations found in s 122. It seems strange that such a holder of securities would need to report the acquisition to the company when in fact it was the re-acquisition by the company that triggered the obligation. 30 See s 117(1)(c)(vi) rw s 123 Companies Act 71 of 2008. S 123(2)(a) requires an offer to be made to all of the holders of remaining securities to acquire those securities if a regulated company reacquires any of its voting securities in terms of s 48 or in terms of a scheme of arrangement, and the result is that before the acquisition a person or concert parties were able to exercise less than the prescribed percentage of all the voting rights attached to securities of that company (35 per cent (s 123(5)) and as a result of the acquisition, that person (and concert parties) taking into account securities already held can now exercise at least the prescribed percentage of voting rights attached to the securities of that company. The possibility that a re-acquisition by the company of less than 5 per cent of the issued securities of the company might impose the obligation on a holder of securities who had no vote on the matter in the first place to make mandatory offers to remaining holders of securities might be one reason why all re-acquisitions by a company should be subject to the approval of a special resolution. However, a consideration of the implications of a mandatory offer as an affected transaction is not part of this article. The possibility of applying for an exemption from the application of any provision in Part B or C Chapter 5 Companies Act 71 of 2008 or from the Takeover Regulations in terms of s 119(6) should not be overlooked.
It is important that it is made clear by the legislature whether what the company is
proposing is a scheme of arrangement or not and also if it is therefore an affected transaction, as this clearly impacts on the procedure that must be followed and approvals that must be obtained by the company.
Appointment of an independent expert
Before a proposed scheme of arrangement can be put to the vote, the company proposing the arrangement is required to retain the services of an independent expert to prepare a report. 31 The appointment and report is required whether the proposed scheme of arrangement includes a re-acquisition by the company of its own securities or not.
This independent expert must satisfy the qualifications of competence, experience and independence set out in section 114(2)(a). If the scheme of arrangement involves a regulated company, regulation 90(3) 32 would also be relevant. This requires the independent expert to be able to demonstrate to the TRP that he is independent and would reasonably be perceived to be so and that he is competent to act in the circumstances. 33 Despite the approval given by the TRP, it may (mero motu or after written representations by holders of securities), at any time require the appointment of a further independent expert.
34
Although a company that proposes a scheme of arrangement that includes a reacquisition of any of its securities would be required to appoint an independent expert, if a company were to propose a re-acquisition outside the context of a scheme of arrangement, it is not obliged by section 48 to appoint an independent expert to compile a report on the proposed transaction. 2008 or the obligation to make comparable offers under s 125 was triggered or it was a partial offer subject to reg 88, the offeree regulated company would need to request a ruling from the TRP as to whether or not an independent expert must be retained. See reg 90(1).
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re-acquisition triggers the application of sections 114 and 115 because it involves more than 5 per cent of the issued shares of any class of shares of the company 36 such an appointment and report is required by section 114(2). Thus, it is important to know whether what is being proposed is a scheme of arrangement or not.
Report by the independent expert and a fair and reasonable opinion
The task of the independent expert (where one must be appointed) is to compile a report to the board that must be distributed to all of the holders of securities in the company. 37 This report is clearly to aid the holders of securities in the company in coming to a decision on whether or not to vote to support the special resolution proposing the scheme of arrangement.
Section 114(3) describes the minimum information that needs to be included in the report. As far as the securities and the holders of the securities affected by the proposed scheme are concerned, the report must identify the type and class of securities that would be affected and include the prescribed information relevant to the value of those securities, as well as describe the material effects on the rights of the holders. 38 The report must also weigh the disadvantages of the scheme against the compensation that would be received. 39 In doing this, the expert must explain the perceived benefits to the business and the prospects of the company. 40 As far as directors are concerned, the material interests of such persons must be stated as well as the effect of the proposed arrangement on these persons and their interests. 41 Further, a copy of section 115 42 and a copy of section 164 43 must be included in the report. If the scheme of arrangement involves a regulated company, the Takeover Regulations would also be relevant. Where an offeree regulated company is the subject of an offer 44 which if accepted would result in an affected transaction, an independent board 45 of the company is obliged by regulation 110(1) to obtain a fair and reasonable opinion from an independent expert. As such an offer could be made by way of a scheme of arrangement, these regulations would be relevant.
46
A fair and reasonable opinion is one given to an independent board by an independent expert on "the fairness and reasonableness of the consideration for an offer taking account of value and price". 47 In order for an independent expert to be able to give this opinion, the expert would clearly be required to conduct a valuation of the offeree regulated company and its securities. Regulation 90(4)- (5) The statutory provisions applying to schemes of arrangement 49 do not specifically require the independent expert to provide a fair and reasonable opinion. Thus if the scheme of arrangement was simply a fundamental transaction and not an affected notice of their objection to the scheme and by voting against the resolution, (see s 164(3)-(4)) such a shareholder is entitled to demand that the company buy out his shares for fair value (s 164(5)- (8)) and, if he does not accept the value offered by the company, to bring a court application asking it to determine the fair value (s 164(14)). 44 Included in the definition of an "offeree regulated company" is a regulated company that is itself the subject of an offer or the securities of which (either partially or entirely) are the subject of an offer: reg 81(o). See s 117(1)(f) Companies Act 71 of 2008 for the definition of "offer". 45 An independent board is defined by reg 81(j) as "those directors of an offeree regulated company whom that company has indicated are independent directors". 46 In the context of a scheme of arrangement which is an affected transaction, the offeror is considered to be a person other than the offeree regulated company concerned who, with the cooperation of the company, proposes to acquire securities of that company in terms of a scheme of arrangement contemplated in s 117(1)(iii): reg 81(p)(iii). Such an offeror may act alone or in concert with others. 47 Regulation 81(h) Companies Regulations 2011. 48 The fair and reasonable opinion of the independent expert and the independent board opinion would form part of the circulars which are required to be distributed in terms of reg 106. See reg 106(3) for who is responsible for the various circulars and regs 106(4)(g) and 106(7)(h). 
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transaction, 50 although an independent expert would need to be appointed to compile a report, no fair and reasonable opinion is specifically mandated. Although much of the information required to be included in the report by the independent expert would obviously cover similar ground to that which would be covered by the fair and reasonable opinion, it is only if the application of the Takeover Regulations is triggered 51 that the independent expert's report must also specifically include a fair and reasonable opinion.
Independent board opinion and the solvency and liquidity requirement
Where the scheme of arrangement involves a regulated company (and thus is an affected transaction as defined), the Takeover Regulations require the independent board of the offeree regulated company (after taking into account the fair and reasonable opinion supplied by the independent expert), to form its own opinion of the offer and of the consideration being offered. 52 This opinion must then be communicated to the holders of securities in the offeree company that would be affected by the offer. 53 Note, however, that where the scheme of arrangement does not involve a regulated company and is therefore not subject to the Takeover Regulations, there is no specific statutory provision requiring the board proposing the scheme to express an opinion on the offer and the consideration being offered.
In forming its own opinion, the board of the regulated company would be required either to value the company's securities itself or rely on work performed by the expert. 54 The board must compare the value and the price with the consideration being offered in order to have a clear basis for its opinion. 
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When considering the independent expert's report, the state of the solvency and liquidity of the company may become apparent to the board. However, neither the statutory provisions regulating the independent expert's report in section 114 nor the Takeover Regulations make specific reference to the issue of the solvency and liquidity of the company. Further, the independent expert is not specifically obliged to consider or express an opinion on whether or not the company will be solvent and liquid immediately after implementing the scheme. It is only where the proposed scheme of arrangement involves a re-acquisition by the company of its own issued securities that the solvency and liquidity of the company would be specifically relevant.
Whether or not the arrangement involves a regulated company, the moment the proposed scheme includes the potential re-acquisition by the company of any of its previously issued securities, the application of section 48 (which regulates the acquisition by a company of its own shares or shares of its holding company) is triggered. 56 Besides certain other limitations and restrictions, 57 section 48(2)(a)
provides that the board of a company may determine that the company will acquire a number of its own shares, "if the decision to do so satisfies the requirements of section 46". has applied the solvency and liquidity test and that it reasonably concluded that the company would satisfy it immediately after completing the proposed distribution.
60
Thus if the scheme of arrangement includes a re-acquisition by the company of its previously issued shares and the consideration for the re-acquisition is company money or property (for example, money raised by the company as a result of the offeror subscribing for new shares in the company), besides the triggering of the application of section 48, 61 section 46 is also triggered. 62 This has the effect of bringing the solvency and liquidity requirements to the fore, which will be some protection for creditors as well as shareholders whose shares are not being reacquired by company. Although the independent expert is not specifically required by section 114 or by the Takeover Regulations to consider the solvency and liquidity of the company, the directors of the company would be required to give the issue of solvency and liquidity some serious consideration in these circumstances, or face the consequences.
63
There is no statutory requirement that the consideration paid when a company reacquires its own securities must come from the company. It could potentially be funded by the offeror or come from some other source. Thus if the scheme of arrangement included a re-acquisition of previously issued shares by the company but the consideration to be paid is not money or property of the company, the company would not be making a distribution (as defined) and the solvency and 
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implement such a scheme of arrangement. Section 119(2)(a) requires the TRP to regulate affected transactions inter alia in a way that ensures that no person may enter into such a transaction unless they are "ready, able and willing to implement that transaction". This would include the financial ability to settle the offer consideration. Regulations 111(4) and (5) would be relevant in this context. These regulations in essence require the offeror to provide irrevocable, unconditional guarantees that there are sufficient funds to satisfy the cash part of the offer consideration.
The TRP has no authority to express any view on the commercial advantages or disadvantages of a proposed transaction when it exercises its powers and performs its functions. 65 Although there are certain Takeover Regulations that might impact on the nature and level of consideration offered for securities under an affected transaction, 66 a holder of securities who opposes a scheme of arrangement altogether or who objects to the consideration being offered could use the appraisal remedy provided in section 164 to ensure that the court decides on what consideration constitutes fair value.
Special resolution to approve the scheme
Before any scheme of arrangement proposed by the board of a company may be implemented, there must be compliance with the approval requirements set down in section 115. Generally speaking, all schemes of arrangement, whether they involve a regulated company or not and whether or not they include any re-acquisition by the company of its own securities, require approval by way of a special resolution adopted by persons entitled to exercise voting rights on the matter. for when the obligation to make comparable offers to acquire the securities of each class of issued securities of that company is triggered by certain schemes of arrangement that involve a re-acquisition by a company of any of its voting securities where the company has more than one class of securities. Reg 87 further regulates comparable offers. See also reg 111(2), which stipulates the minimum consideration that must be offered to holders of the same class of securities in the event that an offeror (or concert parties) has acquired securities of the same class within the six months period prior to the commencement of the offer period. and is granted leave by the court to apply for a review of the transaction by the court.
76
After an application, the court is permitted to review the resolution, and section 115(7) specifies limited grounds on which the court may set aside the resolution.
This could occur where the resolution is manifestly unfair to any class of shareholders or where the vote was tainted by a conflict of interest, inadequate disclosure, failure to comply with the Act or the Memorandum of Incorporation or the rules of the company, or other significant and material procedural irregularity. 
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beneficial interest in a regulated company equal to or exceeding the specified percentage of voting rights in that regulated company". 81 This definition of "control" is also not without its problems. First, as the Takeover Regulations apply only to regulated companies and the definition of "control" contained therein specifically refers to regulated companies, it would not be applicable in the context of a scheme of arrangement that does not involve such a company.
Secondly, it is unclear where the "specified percentage" referred to in the definition of "control" in regulation 81(e) is set out. Section 440A (1) become an acquiring party as a consequence of a proposed scheme of arrangement to which he is opposed is not prevented from voting against the resolution.
84
It is important to know whose voting rights are excluded from the quorum and approval determination in order to ascertain what impact this might have on whether the scheme would be approved or not, and also to ensure that the vote is not tainted by a conflict of interest which would allow the court to set it aside. The uncertainty about whose votes would be excluded created by the lack of clarity as to the meaning of "the greater part of a company" and the meaning of "control" in the context of the definition of "acquiring party" needs to be resolved.
Another basis on which the court could set aside the resolution approving the scheme is where the vote was tainted by inadequate disclosure. In an attempt to ensure that those who are permitted to vote on a resolution to approve a scheme of arrangement receive sufficient information to allow them to make an informed vote, the Companies Act 2008 provides for the appointment of and a report by an independent expert, which report must be circulated to holders of the company's securities. 85 Where the scheme of arrangement is an affected transaction, the obligation imposed on the TRP to regulate affected transactions in a manner that ensures that all holders of relevant securities are provided with sufficient information and time to enable them to reach a properly informed decision would also be relevant. 86 This mandate is achieved by stipulating who is responsible for the offer circular in respect of a scheme of arrangement, 87 what must be included in the offer circular and the offeree response circular, 88 highlighting the obligation to ensure that material changes in information are reported to holders of securities, 89 and requiring all documents to receive the approval of the Panel before they are posted or published. 90 Further, the fact that both the Companies Act 2008 and the Takeover Regulations prohibit the implementation of an affected transaction unless there has been compliance with the reporting and approval requirements and the receipt of a compliance certificate will work towards ensuring that a vote on a resolution is not tainted by inadequate disclosure and that the court does not have grounds to set the resolution aside.
91
In what circumstances a court would set aside a resolution approving a scheme of arrangement on the basis that it was manifestly unfair to any class of holders of the company's securities remains to be seen. Perhaps the courts might be influenced by some of the earlier cases where consideration was given to the principles guiding a court when deciding whether to sanction a scheme of arrangement or to confirm a reduction of share capital. 
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approval requirements of the Act and the Regulations. 94 Thus, it is important to know if a proposed transaction actually constitutes a scheme of arrangement, because this will impact on the procedure to be followed and the approvals required.
However, other than to stipulate that the board of a company may propose and implement any arrangement between the company and holders of a class of its securities (subject to certain approval requirements) and to list a number of methods that may be included in such an arrangement, including the possibility of a reacquisition of its previously issued securities, section 114(1) provides no definition of a scheme of arrangement.
Whether or not any proposal by a company to re-acquire some of its shares in terms of section 48 would constitute a scheme of arrangement is unclear. The fact that a proposed arrangement as contemplated in section 114, which may result in the reacquisition by a company of any of its securities, clearly triggers the application of section 48, 95 does not answer the question of when an arrangement is an arrangement "as contemplated in section 114". Further, the fact that a re-acquisition by a company of more than five per cent of the issued shares of any class triggers the application of sections 114 and 115 96 does not clarify whether or not such a proposed re-acquisition is a scheme of arrangement. Nor does it clarify whether, if it involves a regulated company, it is also an affected transaction. Although it might not be important to label such a re-acquisition a scheme of arrangement, 97 it might be important to know whether or not, if it involves a regulated company, it would be considered to be a scheme of arrangement "as contemplated in section 114". This is because that would mean that it would fall within the definition of an affected transaction under section 117(1)(c)(iii) and compliance with the applicable legislation and the Takeover Regulations would be required. It would also mean that the definition of an affected transaction has been expanded to include a re-acquisition by a regulated company of more than five per cent of the issued shares of any class. 
The obligation to retain an independent expert is also affected by whether what is being proposed is a scheme of arrangement. A proposed scheme of arrangement, whether it includes a re-acquisition of securities by the company or not, as well as a proposed re-acquisition which involves more than five per cent of the issued shares of any class of shares of the company, 98 triggers the obligation to appoint an independent expert to report on the transaction. 99 However, a proposed reacquisition in terms of section 48 outside the context of a scheme of arrangement or which involves a re-acquisition that does not exceed the five per cent threshold triggers no such obligation. 100 As a scheme of arrangement involving an offeree regulated company is an affected transaction as defined, the Takeover Regulations become relevant. 101 These regulations require the independent board of the company to obtain a fair and reasonable opinion from an independent expert. 102 However, the statutory provisions regulating schemes of arrangement do not specifically require this. Thus, if the scheme of arrangement was simply a fundamental transaction and not an affected transaction (as defined), no fair and reasonable opinion would be specifically required by section 114. However, much of the information required in the independent expert's report would obviously cover similar ground. Further, an independent board of a regulated company proposing a scheme of arrangement is required by the Takeover Regulations to form its own opinion on the offer and consideration and to communicate this opinion to the holders of securities affected. 103 If, however, the scheme does not involve a regulated company and is simply a fundamental transaction, there is no statutory requirement imposing this obligation.
Although when considering the independent expert's report the state of the solvency and liquidity of the company may become apparent to the board, neither the 128 / 638 statutory provisions regulating the independent expert's report in section 114 nor the Takeover Regulations specifically refer to the issue of solvency and liquidity. Further, the independent expert is not specifically obliged to consider or express an opinion on this. However, a scheme of arrangement involving the re-acquisition by a company of any of its own securities (whether or not it is a regulated company) triggers the application of section 48. 104 That in turn potentially triggers the application of section 46. As the section latter prohibits distributions by a company unless inter alia the solvency and liquidity requirements in section 4 are complied with and the definition of a distribution includes the transfer of money or property of the company to or for the benefit of shareholders as a consideration for the acquisition of any of its shares under section 48, the solvency and liquidity requirements become relevant. Although the independent expert is not specifically instructed to consider solvency and liquidity, it would be advisable for him to do so.
Directors would, however, be required to consider the solvency and liquidity of the company or face the consequences.
All schemes of arrangement (whether they include a re-acquisition by the company of its own securities or not) require the approval of a special resolution 105 before they can be implemented. However, section 48 does not specifically require shareholders to approve all re-acquisitions by the company of its previously issued shares. It is only if the re-acquisition falls within the provisions of section 48(8) that approval by special resolution is required. Thus if the company embarks on a re-acquisition outside the context of a scheme of arrangement, it is only if the re-acquisition involves acquiring shares from any director, prescribed officer or related person, and/or 106 the re-acquisition exceeds the five per cent threshold that the requirement of a special resolution to authorise the re-acquisition is specifically triggered.
If the special resolution approving the scheme of arrangement was materially tainted by a conflict of interest, the possibility exists that a court could set the resolution aside. 107 In an attempt to limit this possibility, the Companies Act 2008 specifically excludes the voting rights of an "acquiring party" from the calculation of the quorum and percentage approval requirements. 108 An interpretation of the definition of "acquiring party" is hampered by the lack of clarity as to the meaning of "all or the greater part of a company" and the definition of "control". The difference between "control" in the context of the definition of related persons in section 2(2) and "control" as understood in the Takeover Regulations raises questions as to whose votes are excluded. This could potentially have an impact on a decision regarding whether any vote to approve a scheme of arrangement is tainted by a conflict of interest or not.
A number of questions could arise in the context of a scheme of arrangement.
These range from the issue of whether or not a proposed transaction constitutes a scheme of arrangement to the issue of whose votes may be excluded when the transaction is put to the holders of securities in the company. The fact that schemes of arrangement as fundamental transactions and as affected transactions (as a way of achieving a takeover of a company) are a common commercial occurrence means that it is vital that the provisions regulating them are clear and understandable. In this era of making legislation accessible and understandable, the legislature might do well to revisit some of the relevant provisions. given to transactions which include a re-acquisition by the company of its own previously issued securities and when such a re-acquisition on its own would be considered to be a scheme of arrangement and an affected transaction. Comment on the obligation to appoint an independent expert to report on the scheme and the relevance, if any, of the solvency and liquidity of the company embarking on a scheme of arrangement is included. Finally, consideration is given to the need to have a scheme of arrangement approved by a special resolution and the potential exclusion of certain voting rights. The article exposes a number of difficulties with the interpretation of the applicable provisions and suggests that these need to be revisited by the legislature for clarification.
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